Isolating the Theater of War: Operational Implications of Border Sanctuaries in Limited War
Monograph rept. AY 1989/1990
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
Pagination or Media Count:
This monograph examines the French experience in Algeria 1954-1962 and the Israeli experience in Lebanon 1982 in order to determine how operational forces can overcome the operational advantages an adversary derives from border sanctuaries in limited war. An examination of this issue offers US military leaders understanding of the theoretical and practical dimensions of border sanctuaries and of the efficacy of US doctrine on the subject. The Algerian and Lebanese wars demonstrate that sanctuaries offer an insurgent secure bases, lines of communications and lines of operations to train, sustain, disperse, and stage military operations. These benefits enhance his ability to achieve mass, security, and surprise and to conduct maneuver, economy of force operations, and offensives. Though it is not essential for the counterinsurgent to attack sanctuaries directly at the beginning of hostilities, it is imperative that the operational commander negate the advantages that insurgents gain from sanctuaries. He must consider the tactics and techniques required to neutralize sanctuaries in terms of an overarching operational scheme that is suitable, feasible, and acceptable. These conclusions indicate that US doctrine provides a firm foundations for contending with enemy border sanctuaries in limited war.
- Humanities and History
- Unconventional Warfare