Accession Number:

ADA218924

Title:

A Potential Soviet Compromise on Ballistic Missile Defense

Descriptive Note:

Final rept.

Corporate Author:

CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA NAVAL WARFARE OPERATIONS DIV

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1989-11-01

Pagination or Media Count:

17.0

Abstract:

The body of this research memorandum was written before the Baker- Shevardnadze meeting in Wyoming. It presented evidence suggesting that the Soviet Union might agree to a compromise at the Wyoming meeting that defers the issue of ballistic missile defense BMD negotiations to a later stage in arms reductions, thus facilitating a first-stage cut in offensive arms without an explicit Soviet endorsement of the Strategic Defense Initiative SDI. Through this compromise, offensive arms reductions should first be delinked from an agreement on BMD, and then be relinked during the second stage of deeper cuts. Therefore, negotiations on limiting BMD systems, though deterred, are deemed inevitable if the U.S. persists in deploying a strategic defense system SDS. Moreover, some Soviet arms controllers already look beyond the first stage to the prospect of negotiated transition into a strategic defense environment i.e. , a reliance on defensive deterrence. In this approach, Wyoming, then, was expected to be only a first move in the Soviet negotiating strategy for a grand compromise on strategic defense. As explained in the afterword added to the paper, the actual events at Wyoming seem consistent with that interpretation. jhd

Subject Categories:

  • Government and Political Science
  • Antimissile Defense Systems

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE