Accession Number:

ADA214485

Title:

Getting More Deterrence Out of Deliberate Capability Revelation

Descriptive Note:

Interim rept.

Corporate Author:

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1989-08-01

Pagination or Media Count:

51.0

Abstract:

In recent years, the United States has increasingly relied on sophisticated yet sensitive military capabilities to counterbalance powerful Soviet forces. To the extent that the Soviets have little or no understanding of deliberately concealed U.S. capabilities, their assessments of the military balance may be biased. The more successfully the United States protects key capabilities, the more this bias could result in the Soviets overestimating their own military potential relative to that of the United states. A distorted perception of the balance could be destabilizing if it enhanced the Kremlins expectation of military success. Therefore, the United States should consider whether it might deliberately unveil concealed capabilities to influence Soviet perception of the military balance, thereby enhancing deterrence. This Note lays out some first-order propositions about deliberate capability revelation and analyzes its potential efficacy. Keywords Deterrence, Balance of power, USSR, Military force levels.

Subject Categories:

  • Government and Political Science

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE