The Joint Lessons Learned System and Interoperability
Master's thesis Aug 1988-Jun 1989
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
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This study analyzes the evolution of the Joint Lessons Learned System. It examines historical evidence of interoperability issues in US joint military operations from World War II to the present. Three major conflicts World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, are surveyed to identify basic issues, factors affecting problem resolution, and general trends. Six contingency operations Lebanon, 1958 Congo, 1964 Dominican Republic, 1965 Cambodia Mayaguez, 1975 Iran 1980 and Grenada, 1983, are then examined in similar fashion. This review provides the rationale for an effective, institutionalized Joint Lessons Learned System. Based on the evidence, the study then traces the evolution of the Joint Lessons Learned System from 1979 to the present. Primary tools of analysis are two US General Accounting Office Reports issued in 1979 and 1985, recent Congressional documents, the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, and interviews with key personnel involved in Joint and Army Lessons Learned Systems. Basic conclusions of the study are interoperability issues are resistant to resolution clear patterns of failure exist in critical fields including planning, intelligence, communications, fire support, logistics, airlift, command and control and lessons learned activities have not been institutionalized in a systematic and cohesive fashion. Resolution of recurring interoperability issues depends on reversal of these trends.
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics