Accession Number:

ADA199061

Title:

A Strategic Analysis of U.S. Special Operations During the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953

Descriptive Note:

Master's thesis, Aug 1987-Jun 1988

Corporate Author:

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1988-01-01

Pagination or Media Count:

147.0

Abstract:

This study analyzes the strategic effectiveness of special operations conducted by the Far East Command FECOM and the Central Intelligence Agency CIA in Korea during the Korean Conflict from 1950 to 1953. Each organizations effectiveness is determined by examining the areas of strategy, organization and operations. FECOM special operations were limited to partisan operations and psychological operations. The partisans consisted of anti-communist North Koreans organized and led by U.S. cadre beginning in January, 1951. Psychological operations were conducted continuously from July, 1950 by a separate staff element whose capabilities expanded dramatically during the course of the conflict. CIA operations within Korea consisted of intelligence gathering and special or covert activities controlled from headquarters in Japan. Keywords Korean War, Korean conflict, Partisan warfare, Unconventional warfare, Special operations.

Subject Categories:

  • Unconventional Warfare

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE