Battle in the Rear: Lessons from Korea,
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MIL ITARY STUDIES
Pagination or Media Count:
This monograph reviews the experiences of the US Army in planning and conducting rear operations during the Korean War and examines our current rear operations doctrine in light of these experiences. This review is significant because doctrine is developed based upon an armys war experiences or the wartime conditions it expects to encounter. During the Korean War the experiences of many leaders in the Army, and especially those of the Army staff in Washington, were grounded in the campaigns against the Wehrmacht in North Africa and Europe during World War II. It was natural to assume that these leaders experiences would color their decisions regarding doctrine and force structure. In fighting the North Korean Peoples Army NKPA our army faced an enemy trained in the tactics of the Soviet Army and experienced what our current force may see in a future conflict. An analysis of these experiences may offer some insights into the requirements for an effective rear operations doctrine and its related tactics designed to fight Soviet deep operations. The studys analysis reviews both the US Armys and the NKPAs doctrines and tactics for rear operations and guerrilla warfare, respectively. The collision of these two doctrines is then reviewed to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the US Armys doctrine.
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics