Tactical and Strategic Responsiveness in a Competitive Risk-Taking Game.
WISCONSIN HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING PROGRAM MADISON
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Two within-subject experiments are reported in which subjects played either the offensive or the defensive role of a computerized board game. In either roles, the subjects task for each move was to choose between alternative outcome distributions. The game was designed so that subjects were generally best off on offense if they chose the riskier of the two distributions and best off on defense if they chose the more consevative of the two distributions. The results of the experiments are analyzed with respect to subjects actual preferences risk averse vs. risk seeking and their ability to mesh preference with task requirements. In general, all subjects shifted toward risk seeking when they were in poor game position. However, there was no general tendency for subjects to be more risk seeking on offense than on defense. Moreover, there was no general tendency for the best subjects on offense than on defense. Moreover, there was no general tendency for the best subjects on offense to be also best on defense. Instead, it appears that subjects responsed to the game were mainly local i.e., tatical and did not involve global i.e., strategic shifts in risk preference. Keywords risk attitude Competition Aspiration level Tactical responsiveness Game playing Strategic responsiveness Security motivation Potential motivation.
- Operations Research
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics