Middle Eastern Strategic Deployment-Oasis or Mirage?
Master's thesis Aug 1985-Jun 1986
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
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This study assesses the feasibility of the United States deploying its planned military forces for the protection of its national interests in the Middle East, within time constraints previously established in our Southwest Asian contingency plans. The actual deployment feasibility was determined based upon comparisons of historical and current-day, transportation-related strategic military deployments. Past deployments by the United States to Europe in 1944 Normandy Invasion, to Lebanon in 1958, to Grenada in 1983, and by the United Kingdom to the Falkland Islands in 1982, as well as recent Joint Readiness Exercises, were analyzed. Thus, common transportation-related problems served to identify the general causes for delays in the smooth movement of American military forces. This study identified three consistent causes of delays in strategic deployments 1 Lack of adequate deployment training, 2 Inadequate coordination of operational requirements, and 3 Failure to execute specific details in pre-established contingency plans and procedures. The study concludes that the United States is not capable of successfully deploying its combat forces to the Middle East within the time schedules contained in our current contingency plans. This lack of force projection capability is attributed to delays which will be encountered because of unanticipated transportation-related problems. This study cites a weakness in the structure of Army and Joint Commands at Division level and above. The weakness, as identified shows that the contingency planning function is separated from contingency executionoperations functions within these command structures.
- Logistics, Military Facilities and Supplies
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics