Accession Number:

ADA172451

Title:

Strategic and Operational Implications of Iranian Military Operations in the Iran-Iraq War

Descriptive Note:

Master's thesis Aug 1985-Jun 1986

Corporate Author:

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1986-06-06

Pagination or Media Count:

114.0

Abstract:

The thesis has three logical steps leading to the eventual conclusion. First, the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces were fundamentally flawed. From its inception under Reza Shah, the people, army, government trinity had fatal cracks throughout. Muhammed Reza Pahlavi, attempting to build on the same structure, increased the pressure on the people, army, government trinity, resulting in a collapse. The weaknesses of this trinity was demonstrated by the patent inability of the army to defeat the revolution in spite, or even because of, the lavish augmentation of equipment. Second, the Islamic Iranian army proved to have remarkable power and resilience in the Iran-Iraq War. Surprised by a powerful invader, hampered by desertion, eroding equipment, and unreliable logistics, the Iranian Armed Forces resisted the attack and went on the offensive. Actions were characterized by courage and fighting power, excellent staff work, and operational level planning. Third, the change in the Armed Forces was casually linked to the impact of the impact of the Islamic Revolution on the people, army, government trinity. The strong bond between Khomeini and the people, and the new army legitimacy and ethic, had a multiplicative effect on the military capability of the army. The result was an army with resilience, flexibility, and potential for real growth in military power.

Subject Categories:

  • Government and Political Science
  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE