Deception and the Mediterranean Campaigns of 1943-1944
ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
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The American military tends to disregard deception as a tool of war although it is a proven force multiplier and has helped to win many battles. Deception provides the means to get into the enemys decision cycle by forcing the adversary to take actions prejudicial to his operational timetable. This paper examines the contribution of deception to military operations at the operational level of war by focusing on deception in support of the campaigns in the Mediterranean during 1943 and 1944 the amphibious landings in Sicily, Salerno, Anzio and southern France, and the breakouts from the Gustav and Gothic lines in Italy. The research demonstrates the link between operational level warfare, operational maneuver, surprise and deception. The author presents several theories about the conduct of deception in the Mediterranean during World War II and its relevance to planning in support of contemporary military operations.
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics