Accession Number:

ADA164674

Title:

The Sino-Vietnamese Crisis, 1975-1979: An Historical Case Study.

Descriptive Note:

Master's thesis,

Corporate Author:

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1985-05-01

Pagination or Media Count:

112.0

Abstract:

This thesis examines the questions of how China and Viet Nam reacted to the crisis in their relations between 1975 and 1979, and why Chinese ultimately waged war against the Vietnamese. Both Hanoi and Beijing felt the other posed a serious threat to its national security. Each side sought to communicate its concern to the other through a series of signals. This study focuses mainly on the pattern of Chinese signals, as Beijing responded to what is considered increasingly unacceptable behavior by Hanoi. The means of delivery, the rhetorical intensity the level of issuing authority, and the relative timing of the signals all showed indications of escalating as the crisis became more severe. The thesis proposes an index of indicators by which to judge the progress of crisis control. One of the chief difficulties in the Sino-Vietnamese dispute was a conflict of perceptions. Each side was using a different prespective in viewing its own and the other sides position. By using indicators to understand crisis development more fully, decision-makers may be able to exercise crisis management more effectively.

Subject Categories:

  • Government and Political Science

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE