Deficiencies in Current and Emerging Rear Battle Doctrine.
ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
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The U.S. Army currently has a minimum of eight different field manuals that address the operational and organizational concepts for the conduct of the rear battle. A matrix of responsibilities associated with this battle, as outlined in the various field manuals, and included in this essay, clearly depicts the rear battles state of ambiguity with respect to command and control and the 0 O concept. This student essay examines four major deficiencies with current and emerging rear battle doctrine and proposed alternatives to these deficiencies based upon the results of a study conducted by the VII US Corps in USAREUR commencing in January 1984. The major deficiencies examined include command and control, the role and responsibilities of the Rear Area Operations Center RAOC, the base and base cluster defense concept, and the combat support and combat service support units lack of providing sufficient fire power for self-defense. It is the intent of this essay to demonstrate that our current and emerging rear battle doctrine is both inadequate and in some cases contradictory. Furthermore, based upon the criticality of the threat, the rear battle doctrine deficiencies require immediate commitment by the Army for resolution, as the lack of concentration and resolve of these deficiencies could prove costly in any future conflict with the Soviet Union.
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics