Accession Number:

ADA151801

Title:

More on the Evolution of Cooperation,

Descriptive Note:

Corporate Author:

GEORGIA INST OF TECH ATLANTA SCHOOL OF INDUSTRIAL AND SYSTEMS ENGINEERING

Personal Author(s):

• Bartholdi,J. J. , III
• Butler,C. A.
• Trick,M. A.

Report Date:

1984-12-01

Pagination or Media Count:

13.0

Abstract:

This paper discovers new structure in the suggestive world created by Axelrod, which is based on iterated play of the Prisoners Dilemma game, and was studied to reveal how cooperative behavior can arise in a world of egoists. One of Axelrods conclusions is that the viability of a strategy depends on how heavily the future is discounted. Our results explain in additional detail the nature of this dependence, and suggest how a specific cooperative strategy, TIT FOR TAT, might evolve from a world of defectors. Originator keywords include Prisoners dilemma Cooperative behavior and Tit-for-Tat.

Descriptors:

• *WAR GAMES
• *COOPERATION
• STRATEGY
• VIABILITY
• EVOLUTION(GENERAL)

Subject Categories:

• Government and Political Science
• Psychology
• Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE