Accession Number:

ADA151253

Title:

Concepts and Models of Escalation.

Descriptive Note:

Interim rept.,

Corporate Author:

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

Personal Author(s):

• Davis,P. K.
• Stan,P. J. E.

Report Date:

1984-05-01

Pagination or Media Count:

105.0

Abstract:

This study describes a conceptual decision model for treating escalation processes in the automated war gaming of the Rand Strategy Assessment Center. It also summarizes much of what is known about Soviet views on escalation, and briefly reviews U.S. and Western European views. The studys purpose is to provide a logical structure for writing decision rules, a structure that would assure some level of coherence and completeness while encouraging rule writers to consider specific issues and to keep in mind asymmetries in U.S., Western European, and Soviet thinking. Section II reviews the classic Western concept of escalation ladders, notes its weaknesses for two-sided war games intended to reflect Soviet-Western asymmetries, and then develops a more appropriate framework. Sections III and IV compare Western and Soviet concepts of escalation. Section V draws upon the issues of preceding sections to sketch out a conceptual escalation model. It then provides a simplified example of how the model might work in a particular scenario. Finally, Section VI describes a methodology for actually writing decision rules coherently. Additional keywords conflict, deterrence. Author

Descriptors:

• *WAR GAMES
• SCENARIOS
• USSR
• DECISION MAKING
• STRATEGY
• DECISION THEORY
• CONFLICT
• DETERRENCE

Subject Categories:

• Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE