Accession Number:

ADA139940

Title:

Optimum Leakage Attacks on Combined Area-Terminal Defense Systems

Descriptive Note:

Technical rept.

Corporate Author:

MASSACHUSETTS INST OF TECH LEXINGTON LINCOLN LAB

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1984-02-02

Pagination or Media Count:

22.0

Abstract:

This report presents a simple methodology for determining the optimum attack on non-uniform valued targets defended by a layered defense consisting of an area defense of all targets and a terminal defense of higher value targets. Only leakage attacks as opposed to interceptor exhaustion attacks are considered. Depending on the leakage of the defense layers and the number of targets with terminal defense, the optimum attack emphasizes either high value targets attempting to leak through both layers, or else smaller targets having only area defense. Simple equations governing the attack strategy and the expected damage are derived and sample numerical results are presented.

Subject Categories:

  • Numerical Mathematics
  • Antimissile Defense Systems

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE