Accession Number:

ADA133270

Title:

The Myth of Omniscient Cybernetics.

Descriptive Note:

Master's thesis,

Corporate Author:

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1983-06-03

Pagination or Media Count:

131.0

Abstract:

This study attempted to determine a command and control pattern of the NCA to the tactical commander during direct and rapid military intervention due to a crisis. A case study was made of five crises Congo-1964, Son Tay Raid-1970, Mayaguez Incident-1975, Operation Paul Bunyan-1976 Korean tree cutting incident and the Iran Raid-1980. A comparison of the preferred solution developed from the predetermined apparatus operational implementation and the actual command and control of men and organizations of men cybernetics of each case developed a cybernetic pattern. The NCA perceives it has omniscient cybernetics enabling it to effectively and efficiently control operations of any U.S. military force anywhere in the world. Omniscient cybernetics is a defective myth. During a direct and rapid military intervention in response to a crisis the increased involvement of the higher levels of command in tactical planning and execution severely lowered the chances of success of the operation. Conversely, the closer the similarity between the system, operational implementation, and the process, cybernetics, the greater chances of success. Three paramount ingredients narrow the gap and enhance success the principle of unity of command, the principle of simplicity and coup doeil. Author

Subject Categories:

  • Government and Political Science
  • Psychology
  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
  • Bionics
  • Command, Control and Communications Systems

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE