Accession Number:

ADA123587

Title:

Non-Zero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information.

Descriptive Note:

Technical rept.,

Corporate Author:

STANFORD UNIV CA INST FOR MATHEMATICAL STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1982-02-01

Pagination or Media Count:

97.0

Abstract:

An incomplete information environment is one where at least some of the participants do not possess all the relevant data. Much interest has been devoted in recent years to the analysis of such situations. In the economic theory literature, for example the principal-agent problem the theory of auctions signalling e.g., in insurance markets rational expectations equilibria and so on. What are the main difficulties in such problems First, consider the informed persons--those who know more than others. On one hand, it is to their advantage to make use of their additional information in order to improve their own final outcome. On the other hand, by doing so they actually reveal this information--and their relative advantage vanishes. Thus--what is the good of being more informed, if one cannot profit from it This type of conflict is an essential issue in the analysis of incomplete information environments. Author

Subject Categories:

  • Sociology and Law

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE