The Supply of Enlistees to the Selected Reserve Forces,
RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA
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This Note examines the supply of accessions to the Selected Reserve Forces. The decision to join the Reserves involves both a commitment to a second or moonlighting job and a military organization. A model for this decision is developed which combines previous research in secondary civilian labor market participation and military enlistment behavior. This model is tested by using cross-sectional data on reserve enlistment rates and state economic characteristics. Results are generally consistent with the predictions of the Reserve participation model. Reserve enlistments increase with increases in military pay and unemployment, and decrease with increases in pay received on the primary job, pay received from secondary jobs, and hours worked on the primary job. Unfortunately, the results of the analysis are too weak to obtain definitive results for policymaking. In particular, we are unable to rule out the possibility of either a completely inelastic reserve supply function in which pay has no effect on accession rates or a reserve supply function with a unitary elasticity in which percentage changes in pay are offset by equal percentage changes in accessions.
- Logistics, Military Facilities and Supplies