DID YOU KNOW? DTIC has over 3.5 million final reports on DoD funded research, development, test, and evaluation activities available to our registered users. Click HERE
to register or log in.
A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam. Volume VI. Conduct of the War. Book I. Operational Analyses
BDM CORP MCLEAN VA
Pagination or Media Count:
This is Book 1, Operational Analyses, of Volume VI, Conduct of the War, of the Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam. The course of the ground war is treated chronologically in the first five chapters, reflecting the following 1 US Aid and Advice 1950-1960 - often based on faulty perceptions of threat and the natural tendency to create an ally in our own image 2 the Counterinsurgency Era 1960-1964 which resulted from the failure of earlier advice and support and the endemic political instability in South Vietnam 3 America Takes Charge 1965-1968 - when the US deployed the best combat forces it has ever put in the field at the outset of a war, and a period when the massive US presence stabilized the military situation in RVN but deprived both the RNVAF and the GVN from learning how to stand on their own also US and international public support for the war declined steadily 4 US Phases Out 1969-1972 - when public and congressional attitudes made it necessary for the US to turn the war over to the RVNAF, and a period during which serious morale and disciplinary problems wracked many US units 5 RVNAF Stands and Falls - Alone 1973-1975 - when US presidential promises for aid and support failed to materialize and the RVNAF proved unable to stand against the combined arms onslaught of the expanded and modernized PAVN operating from a superior geostrategic position. Air, naval, and unconventional operations are analyzed in the closing three chapters, and in each case the data and analyses cover the entire span of the war.
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE