Accession Number:

ADA080462

Title:

On Market Games,

Descriptive Note:

Corporate Author:

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1968-12-01

Pagination or Media Count:

40.0

Abstract:

The market games -games that derive from an exchange economy in which the traders have continuous concave monetary utility functions, are shown to be the same as the totally balanced games -games which with all their subgames possess cores. The core of a game is the set of outcomes that no coalition can profitably block. The coincidence of these two classes of games is established with the aid of explicit transformations that generate a game from a market and vice versa. It is further shown that any game with a core has the same solutions, in the von Neumann Morgenstern sense, as some totally balanced game. Thus, a market may be found that reproduces the solution behavior of any game that has a core. In particular, using a recent result of Lucas see RM-5518-PR, AD-661 544, a ten-trader ten-commodity market is described that has no solution.

Subject Categories:

  • Economics and Cost Analysis
  • Theoretical Mathematics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE