Accession Number:

ADA071528

Title:

SALT and the Reality of Detente.

Descriptive Note:

Student research rept.,

Corporate Author:

ARMY INST FOR ADVANCED RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES APO NEW YORK 09053

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1975-03-01

Pagination or Media Count:

44.0

Abstract:

The conclusion reached in this study is that the United States is in danger of weakening its nuclear weapons posture as a result of accepting a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the USSR in the SALT negotiations. In our eagerness to secure an arms control agreement we are ignoring the fact that the Soviet Union is and will remain inherently hostile to the United States a fact that is quite evident from their ideological statements as well as from their manipulation of detente. Thus, by the acceptance of this weakened posture as this paper will show, the United States could conceivably be subjected to Soviet nuclear blackmail. The purpose of this paper is to present a realistic appraisal of SALT and detente in light of Soviet ideology.

Subject Categories:

  • Government and Political Science

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE