Accession Number:

ADA066997

Title:

Equilibrium Strategies in Voting Games.

Descriptive Note:

Technical rept.,

Corporate Author:

CORNELL UNIV ITHACA N Y SCHOOL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1978-04-01

Pagination or Media Count:

9.0

Abstract:

A voting game G N,W is defined here as a strong and proper simple game. N is a finite set of voters players and W is a collection of subset of N called winning coalition. A winning coalition w is a subset of N which can guarantee a victory on any issue if all the members in w cooperate. A coalition which is not winning is called a losing coalition. The problem is to find an optimal strategy for each party when each one has the same total financial resources.

Subject Categories:

  • Theoretical Mathematics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE