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Accession Number:
ADA066997
Title:
Equilibrium Strategies in Voting Games.
Descriptive Note:
Technical rept.,
Corporate Author:
CORNELL UNIV ITHACA N Y SCHOOL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING
Report Date:
1978-04-01
Pagination or Media Count:
9.0
Abstract:
A voting game G N,W is defined here as a strong and proper simple game. N is a finite set of voters players and W is a collection of subset of N called winning coalition. A winning coalition w is a subset of N which can guarantee a victory on any issue if all the members in w cooperate. A coalition which is not winning is called a losing coalition. The problem is to find an optimal strategy for each party when each one has the same total financial resources.
Distribution Statement:
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
