Stable Sets for Symmetric, n-Person Cooperative Games.
CORNELL UNIV ITHACA N Y SCHOOL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING
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Stable sets and subsolutions are studied mainly for symmetric, n-person, characteristic-function form games nk in which k-person coalitions are strongly vital, i.e., vs or vk dot sk for k or s or n-1 and vs 0 for all s k. In the first part, two types i.e., systematic and semi-symmetric of stable sets are defined and their existence is investigated. Furthermore, symmetric stable sets are determined for some classes of nk games. In the latter half, the production game presented by S. Hart, which is a kind of nk game, is considered and his open questions are studied. Finally, subsolutions defined by A. Roth are analyzed.
- Numerical Mathematics