Accession Number:

ADA058334

Title:

The 1973 War: Implications for U.S. Army Forces in NATO

Descriptive Note:

Final rept.

Corporate Author:

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1978-06-09

Pagination or Media Count:

179.0

Abstract:

This thesis examines the origins of the 1973 Middle East War from a military perspective. It traces the development of the Israeli Defense Force doctrine and organization through the wars preceeding that of 1973. The effects of certain political and military decisions on the ability of Israeli Forces to successfully meet an Arab attack are evaluated. The central region of NATO is then compared to the conditions surrounding the 1973 War in an attempt to identify any areas of similarity. It concludes that Israeli Forces were unprepared for the attack launched in October 1973 due to faulty assumptions regarding the conditions necessary for an Arab attack. Due to the numerous fundamental differences between the Middle East and Central Europe, any attempts to apply tactical lessons learned from a war in one region to the other must be done with caution. The major finding is that U.S. Forces must prepare for a Warsaw Pact attack based on the enemys capabilities, without regard to preconceived ideas as to the enemys intentions.

Subject Categories:

  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE