Accession Number:

ADA052822

Title:

A Dynamic Theory of Contractual Incentives.

Descriptive Note:

Technical rept.,

Corporate Author:

WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE PHILADELPHIA PA DEPT OF DECISION SCIENCES

Personal Author(s):

• Blanning,Robert W.
• Kleindorfer,Paul R.

Report Date:

1978-02-01

Pagination or Media Count:

24.0

Abstract:

The purpose of this paper is to construct a simple model of the information, incentive, and decision aspects of financial incentive system and to offer insights into the problem of a high-level government unit that wishes to encourage lower-level units and private contractors to behave in consonance with its financial and non-financial objectives.

Descriptors:

• *INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
• *DESIGN TO COST
• MATHEMATICAL MODELS
• MANAGEMENT PLANNING AND CONTROL
• DECISION MAKING
• CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION
• WEAPON SYSTEMS
• PROBABILITY
• COST MODELS
• MILITARY PROCUREMENT

Subject Categories:

• Administration and Management
• Economics and Cost Analysis
• Statistics and Probability

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE