Accession Number:

ADA046124

Title:

The Soviet Strategic Culture. Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations.

Descriptive Note:

Interim rept.,

Corporate Author:

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CALIF

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1977-09-01

Pagination or Media Count:

48.0

Abstract:

The report identifies several factors--historical, institutional, and political--that have given rise to a uniquely Soviet approach to strategic thought. American doctrines of limited nuclear war and intrawar deterrence are examined in light of this Soviet doctrinal tradition. It is argued that such doctrines conflict with deeply-rooted Soviet beliefs hence, Soviet decisionmakers may not abide by American notions of mutual restraint in the choice of targets and weapons. Three caveats are stressed, however. First, evidence on Soviet strategic doctrine is ambiguous. Two, even deeply-rooted doctrinal beliefs may change, albeit slowly, in response to technical or other environmental changes. Three, doctrinal preference is not the only important factor that might affect Soviet behavior in a nuclear crisis. Situational temptations and constraints may carry independent weight. Author

Subject Categories:

  • Government and Political Science
  • Sociology and Law

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE