An Aggregated Model of a Two - Sided Nuclear War
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA PROGRAM ANALYSIS DIV
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The problem of modeling a two-sided nuclear war is examined. In such a war the side that strikes first must consider a number of physical variables-- such as the yield, reliability, and accuracy of its weapons--in choosing a weapon allocation against the other side. However, the most important variable affecting the first strikers allocation is the ability of the second side to retaliate. The model that is developed in this paper is highly aggregated. Value targets on each side are treated as a single target for the other side. The strategic weapons of the second side are also treated as a single weapon target for the first strikers counterforce attack. Thus, the weapon allocations determined by the model are also aggregated The two-sided nuclear war is then posed as a max-min problem in which the first striker seeks to maximize the chosen measure of effectiveness, while the second striker tries to minimize the measure with his surviving resources. Various random effects are also included in the model.
- Nuclear Warfare