Accession Number:

ADA017237

Title:

Social Choice and Coherent Structures

Descriptive Note:

Research rept.

Corporate Author:

CALIFORNIA UNIV BERKELEY OPERATIONS RESEARCH CENTER

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1975-09-01

Pagination or Media Count:

38.0

Abstract:

The purpose of this paper is to show the relevance of reliability theory to the problem of aggregating individual preferences to social preferences over a set of alternatives. First, the Arrow impossibility theorem is proved using coherent structure arguments. Second, coherent systems as decision structures are examined and their properties studied. It is shown that only the self-dual systems are never inconsistent or blocked. It is further found that for any given coherent decision structure any set of alternatives is split into four subsets that have certain interesting properties. Finally, the introduction of probabilities indicates how a cardinal ordering of preferences on the component level can be aggregated to a cardinal ordering on the system level.

Subject Categories:

  • Sociology and Law
  • Manufacturing and Industrial Engineering and Control of Production Systems

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE