Accession Number:



Organizational Identity Bias and Planning: Resistance to Post-Conflict Military Governance

Descriptive Note:

[Technical Report, Monograph]

Corporate Author:

US Army School for Advanced Military Studies

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:


Pagination or Media Count:



The US Army boasts a long history of providing governance in the aftermath of combat, from conflicts in Mexico to Iraq. The Army is the only organization with sufficient resources to perform governance, which is required to connect tactical victory to policy objectives. However, this monograph proposes that institutional bias limits the Armys conception of military power to large scale, decisive combat, derived from historical anomalies such as the Second World War. The organizations understanding of the application of military power is challenged by the requirement to provide governance, which is subsequently underrepresented in doctrine, organization, and training. The consequence has been poor preparation, inadequate allocation of resources, civil-military conflict, and often, failure to realize policy objectives following tactical success. This monograph seeks to understand the Armys institutional bias against governance by examining the preparation, execution and response to military governance in Operations Just Cause, Panama, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Army must identify bias if it is to overcome it, and the repeated failure to prepare for governance in the past suggests that it is not a question of evidence, but aversion. By understanding the nature of this bias, the organization will be better positioned to objectively assess the causes of success or failure of past operations and will be more inclined to incorporate governance into operational planning in the future.


Subject Categories:

  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
  • Military Forces and Organizations
  • Government and Political Science
  • Humanities and History

Distribution Statement:

[A, Approved For Public Release]