ROK Army Operations in the Jirisan Region during the Korean War: David Galula's Counterinsurgency Theory in Action
[Technical Report, Monograph]
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
Pagination or Media Count:
The research started with questioning which factors made the Korean Armed Forces counterinsurgency operations successful during the Korean War in 1950-1953. To analyze the case study of the Korean War, this study applied Galulas COIN warfare theory and principles in Counterinsurgency Warfare as an analytical frame the four laws and the eight steps. His theory was suitable for this study in terms of the level of war, clarity of theory, and historical and regional backgrounds that informed the theorys formation. As the results of analysis as well as the frame, the key factors contributing to the success of the COIN operations in the Jirisan region during the Korean War in 1950-1953 were initial gains of populations support through the destruction of insurgency forces deployment of COIN static units demonstrating the ability to win successful control of the population to build their support and turn an active friendly minority into a majority and finally, destruction of the insurgent political organization by continuous and intensive efforts. With the results, three implications seem the most obvious the importance of the Jirisan region in COIN operations continuous and intensive governmental efforts turning the active minority to the majority is the key in COIN. The author hopes this study contributes to fill a gap in the COIN study on the Korean War.
- Military Forces and Organizations
- Unconventional Warfare