Time Is the Longest Distance between Objectives: Temporal Considerations for Achieving Convergence during the New Guinea and Leyte Campaigns of WWII
[Technical Report, Monograph]
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
Pagination or Media Count:
Doctrine, training and leader development emphasized limited contingency operations LCO in support of the Global War on Terrorism. The Armys myopic approach to LCO and reemergence of peer-capable threats has left the US Army ill prepared to address the evolving security environment. These changes coupled with recent combat experiences provide the motive to retrain and familiarize LSCO doctrine and EAB organizations as operational formations enabling success on future battlefields. The lenses of doctrine, Army MDO concepts, history, and theory form the basis to answer my hypothesis built upon the framework of my proposed research questions. Doctrine and current MDO published concepts will be important to understand how current doctrine was informed by superseded versions and how both are informing new concepts for future application. This study utilizes Dr. Robert Leonhards theories on maneuver warfare, warfare in the information age, and application of time and spatial considerations in the application of large-scale combat operations LSCO. Theories of war and operational art which formed the basis for ALB combined with Leonards theories will facilitate a meaningful understanding of the MDO tenet of convergence. The monograph will study through the lens of history, General MacArthurs effort in World War II WWII specifically the Pacific Theater of Operations PTO, campaigns of New Guinea, and Leyte during the period of January 1944 July 1945. These campaigns are instances to best contextualize temporal considerations to achieve convergence of effects during large scale combat operations.
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics