COVID-19: Lessons to be Learned for National Biosecurity and Future Operational Environments
Journal Article - Open Access
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV FORT MCNAIR DC WASHINGTON United States
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The COVID-19 pandemic caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus brings into stark relief extant inadequacies in both national and global biosecurity preparedness for, and coordinated response to, novel biological risks, threats, and harms. Although there has been much deliberation on bioevents, such discourse has most often been agent-centric and reactive to advancements of adversarial threats. While sound, these approaches have failed to fully anticipate a variety of needs. To stay ahead of the broad scope of threats is to accept the fleeting nature of dominance, envision futures of contested or lost dominance, and prepare plans for rapid transformation of capabilities and deployment. Indeed, this pandemic has revealed gaps in national infrastructures and functions that are necessary to ensure surveillance, accurate and reliable information transfer, and coordination and mobilization of existing resources, goods, and services that are essential to prompt, effective, and sustained response. One can defensibly argue that intelligence and deterrence of chemical, radiological, nuclear, and explosive risks and threats have been well maintained by intra- and international cooperation of various agencies and organizations as well as by the foci, scope, and tenor of international signatory treaties and weapons conventions.
- Medicine and Medical Research
- Biomedical Instrumentation and Bioengineering