Accession Number:

AD1098807

Title:

The 100 Hour Ground War: How the Iraqi Plan Failed (redacted version)

Descriptive Note:

Technical Report,28 Feb 1991,19 Apr 1991

Corporate Author:

ARMY CORPS (7TH) APO NEW YORK 09107 NEW YORK United States

Report Date:

1991-04-20

Pagination or Media Count:

198.0

Abstract:

The CG, VII Corps directed the ACofS, G2 to conduct a review of the Corps battles to determine the Iraqi plan and then describe how that plan was executed. The mission was to quickly establish the truth about the composition, disposition, condition, and performance of the Iraqi Army on the battlefield. Prior to G-day, VII Corps postulated it had a decided advantage in every area except artillery. However, it was not until VII Corps launched its forces on the ground that this advantage was translated into an overwhelming force which quickly flanked and penetrated Iraqs defenses. VII Corps, with air superiority, speed, maneuver, high technology weapons systems, better training and motivation, and superior intelligence and logistics, destroyed the Iraqi 7th Corps , one division of the Jihad Corps, and two of the three heavy divisions of the Republican Guard Forces Command.. VII Corps violent, rapid execution of its plan kept the Iraqi Army reeling from the beginning.

Subject Categories:

  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE