Accession Number:

AD1087824

Title:

The Lens of Operational Art: A Case Study of 1965 Pakistan - India War

Descriptive Note:

Technical Report,05 Jun 2016,25 May 2017

Corporate Author:

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS FORT LEAVENWORTH United States

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2017-05-25

Pagination or Media Count:

60.0

Abstract:

Pakistan and India gained independence in 1947 from Great Britain but arbitrary drawn borders set the stage for prolonged conflict between the two new states. While there have been numerous territorial disputes between both countries, the major disputed area is the state of Kashmir. Pakistan and India have fought three major wars and many small skirmishes but failed to resolve their differences. Major wars include the wars of 1948, 1965, and 1971. The Pakistan-India War of 1965 began as a localized conflict in Kashmir but evolved into an all-out war between both countries. In this war, the Pakistan Army successfully faced the challenge of numerically superior Indian forces and denied them their political and military ends. Numerous studies have looked at this war from multiple angles, but none analyzed it exclusively through the lens of operational art. This study attempts to fill this void in the literature. This research asserts that the Pakistan Army partially employed effective operational art during the1965 War. The evidence in the study supports that the Pakistan Army used the element of decisive point and risk however, it only partially supports the use of balance and Center of gravity by them. This research is useful for all military professional, as it aims at linking the subjective knowledge of operational art with the practical setting of the 1965 War.

Subject Categories:

  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
  • Military Forces and Organizations

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE