Accession Number:

AD1083923

Title:

Improving a Cheating Applicant's Chances in the Secretary Problem

Descriptive Note:

Technical Report

Corporate Author:

AIR FORCE RESEARCH LAB ROME NY ROME United States

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2019-10-01

Pagination or Media Count:

165.0

Abstract:

The Secretary Problem SP is an abstraction of an optimal stopping problem often framed as a decision maker DM choosing from a queue of applicants. The applicants may represent interviewees, prospective spouses, sensor readings, food sources, or military targets. In its simplest form, a decision maker observes applicants one at a time and must choose a point at which to select a single applicant based only on the relative ranks of the applicants observed up to that point payoff may be based on maximizing the probability of selecting the best applicant or minimizing the expected rank of the selected applicant. This paper develops methods for a cheating applicant to find advantageous positions in the queue that either improve the applicants probability of being selected or aid in evading selection. A variant of the SP is explored that allows for non-selection of a poor applicant. It is demonstrated that a statistical test of hypothesis is ineffective for detecting this means of deception, so the advantage is on the side of the cheating applicant.

Subject Categories:

  • Psychology
  • Personnel Management and Labor Relations

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE