Accession Number:



Redefining Relationships: Inserting the Argument for War in Policy, Strategy, and Operations

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Technical Report,26 Jun 2017,24 May 2018

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US Army School for Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth United States

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The argument for war, communicated by the political elite, is an important and overlooked criterion when understanding the relationship between policy, strategy, and the operational approach. Failure to appreciate the political nature in war by strategic and operational planners ultimately leads to disaster. Yet, a clear and defined purpose established by the political elite rarely occurs. Because of the nature of the political system, planners regularly are left with the argument for war as meaningful political guidance in formulating strategy and policy and determining an operational approach. Therefore, understanding the argument for war becomes essential. The overall purpose of this political science study is to explore the relationships between the argument for war and the formulation of policy, military strategy, and the operational approach and to answer the question, what is the nature of the relationship between the aforementioned themes The wider significance of this study is to investigate this relationship from an analysis of three case studies, Kosovo 1999, Iraq 1991, and Afghanistan 2001 and contribute to the overall understanding of strategy and policy formulation and military planning.

Subject Categories:

  • Government and Political Science
  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

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