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Accession Number:
AD1066346
Title:
The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Volume 2: Surge and Withdrawal, 2007-2011
Descriptive Note:
Technical Report
Corporate Author:
ARMY WAR COLLEGE CARLISLE BARRACKS PA CARLISLE BARRACKS United States
Report Date:
2019-01-17
Pagination or Media Count:
713.0
Abstract:
In September 2013, then Army Chief of Staff General Raymond T. Odierno directed the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Study Group to research and write an operational history of the U.S. Armys experience in the Iraq War from 2003 to 2011. This volume of The U.S. Army in the Iraq War is the second of two fulfilling that task. It tells how the surge counteroffensive in 2007-2008 neutralized both the Sunni insurgency and Shia militias, bringing Iraq to its most peaceful and stable state since the invasion. It then describes how, with political support for the war waning, consecutive Presidential administrations began to reduce the number of troops in Iraq while Multi-National Force-Iraq MNF-I and later United States Forces-Iraq USF-I worked hurriedly to prepare the Iraqi military to take responsibility for their nations security. The speed of the drawdown accelerated significantly after the election of President Barack Obama, culminating in an unexpected complete withdrawal in 2011.In scope, the study group members consciously modeled this history after the Armys Green Book histories of World War II. As the Green Books did, and as General Odierno charged us to do, we focused on the operational level of war. These volumes are narrative histories that tell the story of U.S. forces in Iraq, mainly from the perspective of the theater command in Baghdad and the operational commands immediately subordinate to it. They focus on the decisions and intent of the senior three- and four-star commanders in Baghdad over time. In writing this history, we strove to evaluate the major decisions those commands faced, to understand what commanders intended to accomplish, and to comprehend how the commands interpreted the situation at the time. We also traced many of those decisions to the tactical level to judge how strategic and operational intent translated into changes on the battlefield.
Distribution Statement:
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
