Accession Number:



Blind Data Attack on BGP Routers

Descriptive Note:

[Technical Report, Master's Thesis]

Corporate Author:

Naval Postgraduate School

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:


Pagination or Media Count:



Transport Communication Protocol TCP implementations may not properly implement blind attack protection, leaving long-standingconnections, such as Border Gateway Protocol BGP sessions, vulnerable to exploitation. This thesis aims to understand the efficacy ofa blind data attack on BGP sessions. This thesis examines BGP, the protocols BGP relies on, and the effectiveness of safeguards againstBGP blind attacks. A series of blind attack tests are performed against various production BGP implementations to determine howdangerous and feasible a blind attack is on BGP routing information integrity. Blind data attacks can inject and temporarily propagateerroneous routing information however, on the routers tested, the complexity required to brute force connection-specific values makesblind data attacks difficult. Also, there is a high probability that a blind data attack will desynchronize a BGP session without modifyingrouting information. Protective measures are available that could further safeguard BGP sessions, but older router images may notimplement some of the most vital protections recommended today. Organizations responsible for routing infrastructure and networksecurity must carefully weigh the risk of not implementing more strict protection measures should a discovered vulnerability reduceattack complexity.


Subject Categories:

  • Computer Systems

Distribution Statement:

[A, Approved For Public Release]