Accession Number:

AD1045102

Title:

Psychological Operations in Vietnam: Indicators of Effectiveness at the U.S. Army Division Level

Descriptive Note:

Technical Report

Corporate Author:

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS FORT LEAVENWORTH United States

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1969-06-06

Pagination or Media Count:

136.0

Abstract:

In this study the research problem was to identify specific psychological operations PSYOP feedback indicators of effectiveness applicable at the U.S. Army division level in the Vietnam-type conflict. The purpose of the study was to contribute towards filling what was believed to be a gap in the existing guidance and doctrine available to PSYOP personnel in the field at the tactical unit level. The scope of the study was limited to U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam during the period 1965-69 operating within the political, economic, and military constraints characterized by that time-frame. This study was conducted following the principles and techniques of systems analysis combined with case studies, surveys, and documentary research. Primary and secondary reference material and data were gathered from essentially two general areas 1 case studies of the U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam, and 2 a survey of selected student officers in the 1968-69 class of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College CGSC at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The latter group was selected on the basis of having had combat experience associated with U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam. From these two general batches of data, thirty-seven different PSYOP indicators of effectiveness were identified. Upon identification of the PSYOP indicators resulting from the division case studies and the CGSC survey, the indicators were arranged and collated according to central tendencies or mutual patterns of support. It was found that the specific indicators could be grouped into six general categories of PSYOP feedback indicators of effectiveness. Of the six general categories of indicators, statistical data concerning the numbers and frequencies of defectors coming over from the Viet CongNorth Vietnamese Army to the allied forces under the Vietnamese Government Chieu Hoi or amnesty program was found to be the most widely utilized indicator at the division level.

Subject Categories:

  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
  • Military Forces and Organizations

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE