Accession Number:



Blind, Deaf, and Dumb: We Must Be Prepared to Fight for Information

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Technical Report,05 Jun 2016,25 May 2017

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US Army School for Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth United States

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The US Armys experience in combat over the last fifteen years demonstrated an inability to expose enemy intentions without forces on the ground. Currently, US Army corps commanders lack the ability to fight for information to gain the situational understanding necessary to seize and retain the initiative and set conditions for success across all phases of Joint Operations. To win in a complex world, the US Army corps requires a dedicated formation focused on reconnaissance operations that is equipped with lethal, survivable and operationally mobile platforms to seize and retain the initiative over enemy forces. Continuous reconnaissance and security operations are essential to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. To avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, the US Army should remain grounded in doctrine when answering the question of how should US Army corps fight for information. The natural starting point for any solution should begin with the Fundamentals of Reconnaissance. The lack of survivability and firepower within the Stryker platform hinders its ability to retain freedom of maneuver and maintain contact. When a Reconnaissance Force becomes decisively engaged, reconnaissance stops, focus on the reconnaissance objective is lost, and the focus becomes survival. The ability to gain and maintain contact with the enemy on terms and conditions of their choosing is essential. Contact with the enemy provides the staffs with real-time information on the enemys composition, disposition, location, actions and strength that allow the staff to make recommendations to the corps commander. To provide US Army corps commanders the ability to fight for information and gain the situational understanding needed to seize and retain the initiative and set conditions for success across all phases of Joint Operations, the Army must provide a formation that is properly organized and equipped to take on the corps reconnaissance and security mission.

Subject Categories:

  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
  • Military Intelligence

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