BREAKING STOVEPIPES: BRIDGING GAPS IN AIR FORCE INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT TO ENABLE MULTI-DOMAIN MISSION ASSURANCE
AIR WAR COLLEGE MAXWELL AFB United States
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Air Force doctrine inadequately addresses Industrial Control Systems ICS security and as a result, the service is improperly organized and trained to secure missions across the domains of air, space, and cyberspace. In response, the Air Force must consider significant changes at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to provide mission assurance to commanders. An important question that the Chief of Staffs Task Force Cyber Secure TFCS asks is How do we organize, train, and equip Air Force forces to support the five core missions, in and through cyber By their nature, air, space, and cyber dominance are tied to physical platforms from which the Air Force projects power. Increasingly, the line between physical and cyber has blurred as ICS become a key factor in enabling mission assurance through the basing system. Functional stovepipes, specifically those of civil engineer and cyber surety, have resulted in ICS vulnerabilities, threating mission assurance at every one of the services installations. While changes can be made to the way units analyze systems or task organize under a wing, none of that will be effective until Air Force doctrine, both civil engineer and cyber surety adequately recognizes the differences between cyberspace and the traditional physical domains of air and space. The TFCS infrastructure work group should prioritize revising both sets of doctrine to enable the force to view cyberspace for what it is, a digital battlefield that comes under fire every day, whether at home station or forward deployed. Without this revision, the limited mindset of Airmen in the field employing ICS enabled installations and the mission commanders they serve will never change.
- Military Forces and Organizations
- Computer Systems Management and Standards