Accession Number:

AD1034626

Title:

Analysis of Defenses Against Code Reuse Attacks on Modern and New Architectures

Descriptive Note:

Technical Report

Corporate Author:

MIT Lincoln Labortatory Lexington United States

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2015-09-01

Pagination or Media Count:

77.0

Abstract:

Today, the most common avenue for exploitation of computer systems is a control-flow attack in which the attacker gains direct or indirect control of the instruction pointer.In order to gain remote code execution, attackers then exploit legitimate fragments of code in the executable via techniques such as return-oriented-programming or virtual table overwrites. This project aims to answer fundamental questions about the efficacy of control-flow-integrity CFI, a defensive technique which attempts to prevent such attacks by ensuring that every control flow transfer corresponds to the original intent of the program author. Although this problem is in general undecidable, most programs running on modern operating systems adhere to standard conventions which allow inferences from static analysis to set a specification for allowable runtime behavior.

Subject Categories:

  • Computer Systems Management and Standards

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE