This thesis seeks to answer two related questions regarding corruption and Chavismo. First, what factors contributed to the rise in Venezuelas Corruption Perception Index from 20002014 Second, what does Venezuela need to do to reverse that trend The thesis examines Hugo Chavezs populist policies as well as two leading factors for the rise of corruptionweak governance and oil over-dependence practicesand analyzes the Resource Curse theory and Chaveznomics. Chavezs populist policies created neo-patrimonial networks, increasing the intensity of corrupt practices between specific sectors of citizens and political elites. Chaveznomics policies also created a mismanagement of windfall oil rents, establishing a Rentier State for Venezuela. The Rentier State established corrupt patronage networks with state industries that remained intact under the high oil prices during 20002014. The thesis also conducts theoretical analysis of anti-corruption methods while considering Venezuelan societal elements of culture, political will, and international integration. State-center anti-corruption strategies prove to be an appropriate method for Venezuelas societal elements and unique corruption environment. The proposed state-center strategies incorporate a three-prong anti-corruption approach, including political, economic, and social accountability reforms with market-friendly social democratic policies that build political will and civic engagement.