Accession Number:

AD1022141

Title:

Illusion Of Defeat: Egyptian Strategic Thinking And The 1973 Yom Kippur War

Descriptive Note:

Technical Report,05 Jul 2015,26 May 2016

Corporate Author:

US Army School for Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth United States

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2016-06-04

Pagination or Media Count:

57.0

Abstract:

The 1973 Yom Kippur War was a landmark event in the oft-troubled history of Arab-Israeli relations. Anwar Sadat conducted a war for limited objectives to discredit the myth of Israeli vulnerability, jump-start a stalled political process, reclaim the Sinai Peninsula, and ultimately achieve peace with Israel. Egypt had lost tactically, but won strategically. As a result, Sadat is widely believed to be a master strategist. But was he This monograph explores Egyptian strategic thinking leading to the 1973 October War through the lens of Dolmans Pure Strategy. Specifically, Dolmans notions that strategy is not about winning in the traditional sense, but about achieving a position of relative advantage, and that the strategic purpose of war is to attain a better condition of peace.

Subject Categories:

  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE