Accession Number:

AD1021512

Title:

2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War: A Fight of Operational Synchronization

Descriptive Note:

Technical Report

Corporate Author:

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT RI NEWPORT United States

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2013-05-13

Pagination or Media Count:

26.0

Abstract:

Over the course of 34 days in July 2006, the Shia-Muslim, paramilitary force of Hezbollah fought the Israel Defense Force IDF to a standstill and delivered the first Arab Victory over the IDF. Hezbollah armed, advised, and funded by Iran and Syria synchronized efforts of conventional and irregular forces employing nation-state capabilities and denied Israel its objectives. The Israeli Defense Force IDF failed to achieve its objectives during the 2006 war with Hezbollah due to ineffective operational synchronization relative to its adversary. The conditions and circumstances of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war make its study valuable for operational level planners and commanders as it demonstrates the complex problem of state-supported hybrid threats. This state-support enables the proliferation of high-end capabilities like armed drones, advanced anti-tank and anti-ship missiles, and sophisticated protection systems. To meet the unique challenges posed by increasingly capable hybrid-threats, operational planners and commanders must focus on synchronization of multiple punches from the right mix of domains and functions to achieve victory.

Subject Categories:

  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE