The Army faced persistent conflict of a Global War on Terrorism that it had never faced before. It found its forces were not well suited to the conflict and needed to be smaller and able to be a plug and play force that could be tailored to specific missions. The solution was modularity. In response, the Armys personnel community developed Personnel Services Delivery Redesign PSDR. The decision was made after being told to reduce footprint rather than based on a solid mission analysis of capability needed. This invites risk because the critical mission analysis was lacking. This study examines brigade level strength management as a critical component of PSDR and finds that the redesign was effective in many areas, but that there was an overreach on strength management doctrine. Personnel strength management needs to be returned to the general officer headquarters where it formally resided rather than the colonel level brigade that it moved to under the redesigned concept. The justification is based on many factors larger staffs of general officer level organizations are more capable than brigade staffs. Put another way, brigade staffs lack the resources, expertise and training to conduct strength management brigade strength management is often personality dependent on the S1, brigade commander and the personnel leadership and commander of the higher headquarters modularity assumed a brigade centricity and elimination of at least some senior headquarters. Brigade centricity occurred, but the elimination of headquarters did not. Division headquarters still exist and are not willing to give up their former role. Significant remnants of strength management exist at levels between brigades and Human Resources Command HRC. Lastly, under the previous system, the Division Strength Manager billet was a Branch Qualifying now Key Developmental job for an Army AG officer.