Analysis of the Indian Army's COIN experience.
Technical Report,28 Jun 2011,17 May 2012
US Army School for Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth United States
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The last decade has witnessed an exponential growth in terrorism and violence emanating from transnational terrorist organizations and insurgencies. Even though the second grammar of warfare - COIN operations, has existed for ages, this rise in terror has led to a global revisit on COIN. In the light of this renewed focus on COIN, this monograph analyses the experience of the Indian Army in COIN operations. In spite of a six-decade long history of COIN campaigns, these Indian COIN campaigns have remained unknown to the rest of the world. A look at the Indian COIN experience brings out a different perspective on COIN and an analysis of the COIN campaigns of the Indian Army offers pertinent lessons for all Armed Forces engaged in such operations. This paper will attempt to evaluate the conception of the Indian COIN doctrine, which is primarily based for domestic COIN, examine the relevant doctrinal precepts of the expeditionary COIN doctrines of the Western Armies, and bring out the relevant differences and similarities in these COIN approaches. This monograph will examine these Indian COIN campaigns, conducted in complex environments, and trace the iterative doctrinal process, which reached full circle with the enunciation of the Indian Armys Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations - Iron Fist in a Velvet Glove in 2006. The Indian experience highlights the primacy of the population in the solution of an insurgency, reiterates the fact that military COIN campaigns are a part of the larger politico-military resolution process and brings out a suggested line of effort model for COIN campaigns.