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Evolution of United States Army Deployment Operations: The Santiago Campaign

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Technical Report,01 May 2015,01 Jun 2015

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US Army School for Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth United States

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This monograph examines the evolution of United States Army deployment operations through the failures during the 1898 Santiago Expeditions mobilization through Tampa, Florida. The failed experiences from the Spanish-American War provided the evolutional foundation for successful deployment operations to France during World War I. The results from the experiences in Tampa have developed in current United States Army doctrine Field Manual 3-35, Army Deployment and Redeployment. In 1898, the United States Army failed to plan for basing, tempo, and operational reach, three elements of operational art, now foundational in current doctrine. Implications from this expedition are relevant in todays contemporary operating environments as United States global commitments require efficient and effective deployment support to project and sustain American combat power. Planners must consider basing needs with expandable and retractable capabilities to support operations. Commanders must understand deployment tempo operations in todays aggressive environment consisting of enemy Anti-Access Anti-Denial measures. Finally, basing must provide operational reach capabilities able to support coalition and multi-national force partners. By successfully incorporating these three elements of operational art into deployment operations today, the United States military is able to link tactical action in time, space, and purpose toward the attainment of strategic objectives.

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