Accession Number:

AD0735260

Title:

Uniformity Theorems in Missile Duels

Descriptive Note:

Corporate Author:

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1971-09-01

Pagination or Media Count:

30.0

Abstract:

A theorem dealing with the purchase of defensive weapon systems is proven. The purchasers objective is assumed to be the achievement of an assumed destruction criterion at minimal cost. It is shown that under certain circumstances it is optimal to purchase a uniform defensive system. The applicability of the mathematical theorem to the real world is then studied. A second theorem gives a simple procedure for finding an attackers optimal firing rule under very general circumstances. An example illustrates the problems in choosing a defensive weapon system.

Subject Categories:

  • Antimissile Defense Systems
  • Nuclear Warfare

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE