MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND SUPPLY LINES AS COMPARATIVE INTERDICTION TARGETS
RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA
Pagination or Media Count:
An initial attempt to provide a quantitative basis for comparing military unit movements with unit-supply lines as targets for interdiction. Based on U.S. Army unit tables of equipment and standard supply planning factors, the analysis shows that a division movement is considerably more vulnerable to attacks directed against road capacity than that divisions supply line would be. Even with all assumptions biased in favor of mobility no traffic congestion, no vehicle breakdowns, no command control problems, POL available as needed, road movement of an infantry division consumes 6 to 8 times as much of a roads surge capacity as its daily combat resupply consumes of the roads average steady-state capacity. For rail movement, the redeploymentresupply ratio is very large, varying from 127 to 145 times the railroad capacity needed for resupply.
- Logistics, Military Facilities and Supplies
- Unconventional Warfare